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Abstract We study the fair division of a continuous resource, such as a land-
estate or a time-interval, among pre-specified groups of agents, such as families.
Each family is given a piece of the resource and this piece is used simultane-
ously by all family members, while different members may have different value
functions. Three ways to assess the fairness of such a division are examined.
(a) Average Fairness means that each family’s share is fair according to the
”family value function”, defined as the arithmetic mean of the value functions
of the family members. (b) Unanimous Fairness means that all members in all
families feel that their family’s share is fair according to their personal value
function. (c) Democratic Fairness means that in each family, at least a fixed
fraction (e.g. a half) of the members feel that their family’s share is fair. We
compare these criteria based on the number of connected components in the
resulting division and on their compatibility with Pareto-efficiency.
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1 Introduction
Fair division of heterogeneous resources among agents with different prefer-
ences has been an important issue since Biblical times. Today it is an active
area of research in the interface of computer science (Robertson and Webb
1998; Procaccia 2015; Braˆnzei 2015; Lindner and Rothe 2016) and economics
(Moulin 2004; Thomson 2011). Its applications range from politics (Brams and Taylor
1996; Brams 2007) to multi-agent systems (Chevaleyre et al 2006).
In most fair division problems, the resource is divided among n individual
agents, and the fairness of a division is assessed based on their individual pref-
erences. A common fairness criterion is proportionality. It requires that each
agent receives a share that is at least as good as 1/n of the total endowment,
according to the agent’s individual preferences.1
In practice, however, goods are often owned and used by groups. As an
example, consider a land-estate inherited by k families, a river that has to be
divided among k states, or the usage-time of a conference room that has to be
divided among k meeting groups. The resource (whether land or time) should
be divided into k pieces, one piece per group. Each group’s share is then
used by all its members simultaneously. The land-plot allotted to a family
is inhabited by the entire family. The share of the river allotted to a state
becomes a national park open to all its citizens. In the time-slot allotted to a
group, the conference room is used by all group members.2
The happiness of each group member depends on his/her valuation of the
entire share of the group. But, in each group there are different members with
different valuations. The group’s share can be valued by some of its members
as at least 1/k of the total and by others as less than 1/k of the total. How,
then, should the fairness of a division be assessed?
The present paper studies this question in the classic setting of cake-cutting,
introduced by Steinhaus (1948). In this setting, there is a measurable space
(e.g. an interval or a polygon) called the cake. The preferences of each agent
are represented by a value-measure on the cake.3
We study three ways to assess the fairness of a division.
1 The condition of receiving at least 1/n of the total endowment was introduced by
Steinhaus (1948). Economists often call it fair-share guarantee (Bogomolnaia et al 2017).
Computer scientists often call it proportionality (Robertson and Webb 1998).
2 In economic terms, the allotted piece becomes a ”club good” (Buchanan 1965).
3 The assumption that agents’ preferences can be represented by measures is a strong
one. It implies that the agents’ value functions are linear — the sum of values of two
disjoint pieces equals the value of their union. This implies that the agents have constant
marginal utilities (Chambers 2005) — the marginal utility of a land-plot for an agent does
not depend on the other land-plots owned by that agent. Although this assumption is not
always realistic, it is often made for practical reasons — it is much easier to ask people to
report linear preferences than to report general preferences. See Bogomolnaia et al (2017)
for a recent discussion of this issue. Although most papers on the cake-cutting problem
assume linearity, there are some notable exceptions; they are surveyed in subsection 8.5.
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First, it is possible to aggregate the valuations in each family to a sin-
gle family valuation. Following the utilitarian tradition (Bentham 1789), the
family-valuation can be defined as the sum or (equivalently) the arithmetic
average of the valuations of all family members. We call a division average-
fair if it is fair according to these family valuations. In particular, a division is
averagely-proportional if every family receives a share with an average value
(averaged over all family members) of at least 1/k of its average value of the
entire endowment.
By this definition, the family-division problem is easy to solve. Since the
average of measures is itself a measure, each family can be represented by
a single agent, and the problem reduces to fair division among the k repre-
sentatives. Classic results imply that averagely-proportional allocations exist
(Section 3).
Average fairness makes sense only when the numerical values of the agents’
valuations are meaningful and they are all measured in the same units, e.g.
in dollars (see chapter 3 of Moulin (2004) for some real-life examples of such
situations). However, if the valuations represent individual happiness measures
that cannot be put on a common scale, then their sum is meaningless, and
other fairness criteria should be used.
A second option is to require that all members of every family agree that
the division is fair. We call a division unanimous fair if it is fair according
to every individual valuation. In particular, a division is unanimously-propor-
tional if every agent values his/her family’s share as at least 1/k of the total
value. The advantage of this definition is that it does not need to assume
that all valuations share a common scale. Even though it is a very strong re-
quirement, we prove that unanimously-proportional allocations exist (Section
4).
A disadvantage of unanimous fairness, compared to average fairness, is
that unanimously-fair divisions might be highly fractioned. When an interval
is divided, there always exists an averagely-proportional division that is also
connected — the share of each family is a single interval (Section 3). However,
there might not exist connected unanimously-proportional divisions. More-
over, in some cases, the number of intervals in any unanimously-proportional
division might be at least n — the number of individual agents (Section 4).
When the number of agents is large, as in the case of dividing land among
states, such divisions might be impractical.
In democratic societies, decisions are almost never unanimous. In fact,
when the number of citizens is large, it may be impossible to attain unanim-
ity on even the most trivial issue, and decisions are often made by voting.
Therefore we suggest a third fairness criterion. Given a fraction h ∈ [0, 1], we
call a division h-democratic fair if at least a fraction h of the members in
each family consider it fair. Unanimous-fairness is equivalent to 1-democratic
fairness. The case h = 1
2
is particularly interesting. 1
2
-democratic fairness can
be justified by the following process. After a division is proposed, each family
conducts a referendum in which each member approves the division if he/she
values the family’s share as at least 1/k of the total. The division is imple-
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mented only if, in every family, a (weak) majority of the population approves
it.
Democratic-fairness combines some advantages of unanimous-fairness and
average-fairness. It is similar to unanimous-fairness in that it does not need
to assume that all valuations share a common scale. It is similar to average-
fairness in that, when h ≤ 1k , h-democratic fairness among k families can
be attained with connected pieces. In particular, with k = 2 families, there
always exists an allocation in which each family receives a single connected
piece, and at least a weak majority in each family considers the allocation fair.
An additional advantage of democratic fairness in this case is that it can be
computed efficiently (Section 5).4
Although democratic-fairness might leave some citizens unhappy, this may
be unavoidable in real-life situations. This is understandable in light of Win-
ston Churchil’s dictum: “democracy is the worst form of government, except
all the others that have been tried”.5
While the geometric requirement of having a connected division is practi-
cally important, an even more important requirement from an economic per-
spective is Pareto-efficiency. All three variants of proportionality are com-
patible with Pareto-efficiency. However, connectivity and Pareto-efficiency are
incompatible even without fairness considerations (Section 6).
The proportionality criterion can be generalized to a situation in which
each family has a different entitlement. Suppose that each family j is enti-
tled to a fraction tj of the resource (where
∑k
j=1 tj = 1). An allocation is
unanimously-proportional if each member in family j believes that the share
of family j is worth at least a fraction tj of the total. In a similar way it
is possible to generalize average-proportionality and democratic-proportional-
ity. In the simplest setting, the families have equal entitlements, i.e, for each
j ∈ {1, . . . , k}: tj = 1/k. Equal entitlements make sense, for example, when
k siblings inherit their parents’ estate. While an heir will probably like to
take his family’s preferences into account when selecting a share, each heir is
entitled to 1/k of the estate regardless of the family size.
In general, each family may have a different entitlement. The entitlement
of a family may depend on its size but may also depend on other factors. For
example, consider several families who jointly buy a vacation apartment. The
4 In contrast, average-fair and unanimous-fair allocations cannot be computed by any
finite protocol. See Remark 1 in page 9.
5 A fourth fairness criterion that could be considered is individual fairness. In partic-
ular, an allocation is individually-proportional if the allocation X = (X1, . . . ,Xk) admits a
refinement Y = (Y1, . . . , Yn), where for each family Fj , ∪i∈FjYi = Xj , such that for each
agent i, Vi(Yi) ≥ 1/n. Individually-fair allocations always exist and can be found by us-
ing any classic fair division procedure on the individual agents, disregarding their families.
Individual-fairness makes sense if, after the division of the land among the families, each
family intends to further divide its share among its members. However, often this is not the
case. When an inherited land-estate is divided between two families, the members of each
family intend to live and use their entire share together, rather than dividing it among them.
Therefore, the happiness of each family member depends on the entire value of his family’s
share, rather than on the value of a potential private share he would get in a hypothetic
sub-division.
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apartment can host one family at a time, so the families have to divide the
year (a time-interval) among them. The entitlement of each family naturally
depends on the amount of money it contributed to the purchase, rather than
on the family’s size.6 The results presented in Sections 3–6 consider propor-
tionality both with equal and with different entitlements.
An alternative fairness criterion that is very common in economics is envy-
freeness. In the context of individual agents, it means that each agent receives
a share that is at least as good as the share of any other agent, according
to the first agent’s individual valuation.7 In the context of families, three
variants of envy-freeness can be defined analogously to the three variants of
proportionality (for families with equal entitlements): average-envy-freeness,
unanimous-envy-freeness and democratic-envy-freeness (Section 7).
From a geometric perspective, these three variants behave similarly to their
proportionality counterparts, that is:
– Connected averagely-envy-free allocations always exist;
– Connected unanimously-envy-free allocations are not guaranteed to exist
even for two families;
– Connected 1k -democratically-envy-free allocations are guaranteed to exist
for k families. In particular, connected 1
2
-democratically-envy-free alloca-
tions are guaranteed to exist for two families (but not for three or more
families).
However, from an economic perspective, envy-freeness behaves differently:
– Pareto-efficient averagely-envy-free allocations always exist;
– Pareto-efficient unanimously-envy-free allocations are guaranteed to exist
for two but not for three or more families;
– Pareto-efficient 1
2
-democratically-envy-free allocations are guaranteed to
exist for two but not for five or more families (we do not know whether
they always exist for three or four families).
The paper is organized as follows. Most of the paper focuses on the pro-
portionality criterion. Section 2 formally presents the model. Sections 3, 4 and
5 study average, unanimous and democratic proportionality respectively. We
study this criterion both for families with equal entitlements and for families
with different entitlements.
Section 6 studies the three variants of proportionality in combination with
Pareto-efficiency. Section 7 studies family fairness based on the envy-freeness
criterion, explaining the differences between the results for proportionality
and for envy-freeness. Finally, Section 8 compares our work to previous and
ongoing related work.
6 See Cseh and Fleiner (2018) for a recent account of fair division among individual
agents with different entitlements.
7 The condition of receiving at least as much as any other agent was in-
troduced by Gamow and Stern (1958) and Foley (1967). Economists often call it
no envy (Bogomolnaia et al 2017). Computer scientists often call it envy-freeness
(Robertson and Webb 1998).
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2 Model and Notation
2.1 Resource and agents
In the usual cake-cutting setting, there is a resource C (“cake”) that has to
be divided. For simplicity it is assumed that C is an interval in R. A realistic
example of such a resource is time: consider a conference room that can host
a single meeting at a time. It is available between 8:00 and 20:00, and this
time-interval must be divided among all those who want to use the room.
Another realistic example is the shoreline of a sea or a river: while usually not
a straight line, it can be easily mapped to an interval.
There is a set of agents N = {1, . . . , n}. Each agent i ∈ N has a value
measure Vi, defined on the Borel subsets of C. The Vi are assumed to be
nonatomic, so that all singular points have a value of 0 to all agents. As the
term measure implies, the Vi are additive — the value of a union of two disjoint
pieces is the sum of the values of the pieces. The value measures are normalized
such that ∀i : Vi(∅) = 0, Vi(C) = 1.
2.2 Families and entitlements
In our setting, there is a set of families F = {F1, . . . , Fk}. We use the term
“family” to emphasize that the partition of agents to groups is fixed in advance
and cannot be modified during the division process.
The number of agents in Fj is denoted nj . Each agent i ∈ N is a member
of exactly one family Fj ∈ F , so n =
∑k
j=1 nj .
For each family Fj , there is a positive number tj representing the entitle-
ment of this family. The sum of all entitlements is one: 1 =
∑k
j=1 tj . In the
special case in which all families have equal entitlements, we have for each
j ∈ {1, . . . , k}: tj = 1/k.
2.3 Allocations and components
An allocation is a vector of k pieces, X = (X1, . . . , Xk), one piece per family,
such that the Xj are pairwise-disjoint and ∪jXj = C.
Each piece is a finite union of intervals. We denote by Comp(Xj) the
number of connected components (intervals) in the piece Xj , and by Comp(X)
the total number of components in the allocation X, i.e:
Comp(X) =
k∑
j=1
Comp(Xj)
Ideally, we would like that each piece be connected, i.e, ∀i : Comp(Xi) =
1 and Comp(X) = k. This requirement is especially meaningful when the
divided resource is a time-interval or a land-resource (e.g. a river-bank), since
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a contiguous piece of time or land is much easier to use than a collection of
disconnected patches.
However, we will show that a fair division with connected pieces is not al-
ways possible.8 In case a division with connected pieces is not possible, it is still
desirable that the number of connectivity components — Comp(X) — be as
small as possible. When dividing an interval, the components are sub-intervals
and their number is one plus the number of cuts. Hence, the number of com-
ponents is minimized by minimizing the number of cuts (Robertson and Webb
1995; Webb 1997; Shishido and Zeng 1999; Barbanel and Brams 2004, 2014).
In a realistic, 3-dimensional world, the additional dimensions can be used to
connect the components, e.g, by bridges or tunnels. Still, it is desirable to
minimize the number of components in the original division in order to reduce
the number of required bridges/tunnels.9
2.4 Fairness criteria
We first define the family-valuation functions:
W avgj (Xj) =
∑
i∈Fj
Vi(Xj)
nj
for j ∈ {1, ..., k}.
Now, an allocation X is called:
averagely-proportional if ∀j ∈ {1, . . . , k} : W avgj (Xj) ≥ tj ;
unanimously-proportional if ∀j ∈ {1, . . . , k} : ∀i ∈ Fj : Vi(Xj) ≥ tj ;
h-democratically-proportional if ∀j ∈ {1, . . . , k},
for at least a fraction h of the members i ∈ Fj : Vi(Xj) ≥ tj .
A property of an allocation is called feasible if for every k families and n agents
there exists an allocation satisfying this property. Otherwise, the property is
called infeasible. In the following sections we will study the feasibility of the
above fairness criteria.
Note that unanimous-proportionality obviously implies both average-pro-
portionality and h-democratic-proportionality for any h ∈ [0, 1]. The other
two do not imply each other, as shown in the following example.
8 This impossibility appears not only in our one-dimensional theoretic model but also
in practical, two-dimensional land division situations. A striking example was the India-
Bangladesh border. According to Wikipedia page India–Bangladesh enclaves, up to 2015,
“Within the main body of Bangladesh were 102 enclaves of Indian territory, which in
turn contained 21 Bangladeshi counter-enclaves, one of which contained an Indian counter-
counter-enclave... within the Indian mainland were 71 Bangladeshi enclaves, containing 3
Indian counter-enclaves”. Another example is Baarle-Hertog — a Belgian municipality made
of 24 separate parcels of land, most of which are exclaves in the Netherlands. For more de-
tails and examples see the Wikipedia page List of enclaves and exclaves. We are grateful to
Ian Turton for the references.
9 The goal of minimizing the number of components is pursued not only in cake-cutting
papers but also in real-life politics. Going back to India and Bangladesh, after many years
of negotiations they finally started to exchange most of their enclaves during the years
2015-2016. This reduced the number of components from 200 to a more reasonable number.
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Example 1 Consider an interval consisting of four sub-intervals. It has to be di-
vided between two families: (1) {Alice,Bob,Chana} and (2) {David,Esther,Frank}.
The families have equal entitlements, i.e, t1 = t2 = 1/2. Each member’s valu-
ation of each sub-interval is shown in the table below:
Alice 60 30 3 3
Bob 50 40 3 3
Chana 10 80 3 3
David 3 3 60 30
Esther 3 3 60 30
Frank 3 3 0 90
Note that the value of the entire interval is 96 for all agents. Therefore, pro-
portionality implies that each family should get a value of at least 48.
If the two leftmost subintervals are given to family 1 and the two rightmost
subintervals are given to family 2, then the division is unanimously-propor-
tional, since each member of each family feels that his family’s share is worth
90. This division is also, of course, averagely-proportional and democratically-
proportional.
If only the single leftmost subinterval is given to family 1 and the other
three are given to family 2, then the division is still 1
2
-democratically-pro-
portional, since Alice and Bob feel that their family received more than 48.
However, Chana feels that her family received only 10, so the division is
not unanimously-proportional. Moreover, the division is not averagely-pro-
portional since the average valuation of family 1 is only (60+50+10)/3=40.
If the three leftmost subintervals are given to family 1 and only the right-
most one is given to family 2, then the division is averagely-proportional, since
family 2’s average valuation of its share is (30+30+90)/3=50. However, it is
not unanimously-proportional nor even 1
2
-democratically-proportional, since
David and Esther feel that their share is worth only 30. ⊓⊔
3 Average fairness
With average fairness, the family cake-cutting problem can be reduced to the
classic problem of cake-cutting among individuals. This gives the following
results.
Theorem 1 (a) When families have equal entitlements, average-proportion-
ality with connected pieces (and k components) is feasible.
(b) When families have different entitlements, average-proportionality with
connected pieces is infeasible. Moreover, at least 2k − 1 components may be
required for an averagely-proportional allocation.
(c) When families have different entitlements, average-proportionality with
at most O(k log k) components is feasible.
Proof The positive results — parts (a) and (c) — are based on the following
reduction. For each family Fj , define a representative agent Aj whose valuation
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is the functionW avgj defined in Subsection 2.4 above. Note that, since the Vi are
all nonatomic measures, the k family-valuationsW avgj are nonatomic measures
too. By classic results (Steinhaus 1948; Even and Paz 1984), when there are k
agents with equal entitlements, there always exists a connected proportional
division. As shown in a recent technical report (Segal-Halevi 2019), when there
are k agents with different entitlements, there always exists a proportional
allocation with at most 2k log2 k̂−2k̂+2 cuts, where k̂ := 2
⌈log
2
k⌉ = k rounded
up to the nearest power of two. These cuts create 2k log2 k̂−2k̂+3 components.
By definition, such a division is an averagely-proportional division among the
families.
The negative result (b) follows immediately from an identical negative
result for individual agents (Segal-Halevi 2019), by considering k one-member
families. ⊓⊔
Remark 1 Fairness for individuals and average-fairness for families are equiv-
alent only from an existential perspective; from a computational perspective
they are quite different. A connected proportional division among k individual
agents with equal entitlements can be found by asking the agents O(k log k)
queries (Even and Paz 1984).10 However, an averagely-proportional division
cannot be found using a finite number of such queries, even when there are
k = 2 families with two agents in each family, and even without any restrictions
on the number of components.
Proof The proof is by a reduction from the problem known as equitable cake-
cutting. This is a variant of fair division among individual agents, in which the
fairness criterion for an allocation X is that every two agents have the same
subjective utility, i.e. ∀i, j : Vi(Xi) = Vj(Xj). Procaccia and Wang (2017),
extending a previous result by Cechla´rova´ and Pilla´rova´ (2012), showed that
an equitable allocation cannot be computed by a finite number of queries, even
when there are only two individual agents and no connectivity constraints. We
show that the same is true for averagely-proportional allocation.
Given an instance of equitable cake-cutting with two agents with value-
measures V1 and V2, construct an instance of averagely-proportional division
with two families, where in each family there are two members with value-
measures V1 and V2. We claim that an allocation is equitable in the original
10 In the standard computational model of fair cake-cutting, the central planner is allowed
to ask each individual agent one of two types of queries: an eval query asks about the agent’s
value for a given piece of cake, and a mark query asks the agent to denote a piece with a
given value. See Robertson and Webb (1998) for a formal definition.
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problem if-and-only-if it is averagely-proportional in the new problem:
The allocation (X1, X2) is equitable among the individuals
⇐⇒ V1(X1) = V2(X2)
⇐⇒ V1(X1) = 1− V2(X1) (since V2(X1) + V2(X2) = V2(C) = 1)
⇐⇒ [V1(X1) + V2(X1)]/2 = 1/2
⇐⇒ [V1(X1) + V2(X1)]/2 ≥ 1/2 and [V1(X1) + V2(X1)]/2 ≤ 1/2
⇐⇒ [V1(X1) + V2(X1)]/2 ≥ 1/2 and [V1(X2) + V2(X2)]/2 ≥ 1/2
(since Vi(X1) + Vi(X2) = Vi(C) = 1)
⇐⇒ The allocation (X1, X2) is averagely-proportional among the families.
Hence, if we could find an averagely-proportional division by a finite number
of queries, we could also find an equitable division by a finite number of queries
— a contradiction to Procaccia and Wang (2017). ⊓⊔
4 Unanimous fairness
Before presenting our results, we note that unanimous-proportionality, like
average-proportionality, can also be defined using family-valuation functions.
Define:
Wminj (Xj) := min
i∈Fj
Vi(Xj) for j ∈ {1, ..., k}.
Then, a division is unanimously-proportional if and only if:
∀j :Wminj (Xj) ≥ tj
However, in contrast to the functions W avg defined in Section 3, the functions
Wmin are in general not additive. For example, suppose C is an interval with
three subintervals and a family has the following valuations:
C1 C2 C3 C1 ∪ C2 ∪ C3
Alice 1 1 1 3 = 1 + 1 + 1
Bob 0 2 1 3 = 0 + 2 + 1
Chana 0 1 2 3 = 0 + 1 + 2
Wmin 0 1 1 3 > 0 + 1 + 1
While the individual valuations are additive, Wmin is not additive (it is not
even subadditive). Therefore, the classic results we used in Theorem 1 are
inapplicable here, and different techniques are needed.
Fair Cake-Cutting among Families 11
4.1 Exact division
Initially, we assume that the entitlements are equal, i.e: tj = 1/k for all j.
We relate unanimous-proportionality to the problem of finding an exact divi-
sion:11.
Definition 1 Exact(N,K) is the following problem. Given N agents and an
integer K, divide C into K pieces, such that each of the N agents assigns
exactly the same value to all pieces:
∀j = 1, ...,K : ∀i = 1, ..., N : Vi(Xj) = 1/K.
From an economic perspective, there is little intrinsic value in the concept of
exact division. However, in this section we will prove that it is closely linked
to the concept of unanimously-fair division. In fact, we will prove that the
existence of a solution to each of these problems implies a solution to the
other problem.
Below, we denote by UnanimousPR(n, k) the problem of finding a unan-
imously-proportional division when there are n agents grouped in k families
with equal entitlements.
4.2 UnanimousPR =⇒ Exact
Lemma 1 For every pair of integers N ≥ 1,K ≥ 1, a solution to Unani-
mousPR (N(K − 1)+ 1, K) implies a solution to Exact (N,K) with the same
number of components.
Proof Given an instance of Exact(N,K) (N agents and a number K of re-
quired pieces), create K families. Each of the first K − 1 families contains N
agents with the same valuations as the given agents. The K-th family contains
a single agent whose valuation is V ∗, defined as the average of V1, . . . , VN :
V ∗ =
1
N
N∑
i=1
Vi.
The total number of agents in allK families is N(K−1)+1. Use UnanimousPR
(N(K−1)+1, K) to find a unanimously-proportional division,X . By definition
of unanimous fairness, for each agent i in family j: Vi(Xj) ≥ 1/K.
By construction, each of the firstK−1 families has an agent with valuation
Vi. Hence, all N agents value each of the first K − 1 pieces as at least 1/K
and:
∀i = 1, ..., N :
K−1∑
j=1
Vi(Xj) ≥
K − 1
K
.
11 The definition uses capital N and K to distinguish the parameters of exact division
from the parameters of unanimous-fair division.
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Hence, by additivity, every agent values the K-th piece as at most 1/K:
∀i = 1, ..., N : Vi(XK) ≤ 1/K.
The piece XK is given to the agent with value measure V
∗, so by proportion-
ality: V ∗(XK) ≥ 1/K. By construction, V ∗(XK) is the average of the Vi(XK).
Hence:
∀i = 1, ..., N : Vi(XK) = 1/K.
Again by additivity:
∀i = 1, ..., N :
K−1∑
j=1
Vi(Xj) =
K − 1
K
.
Hence, necessarily:
∀i = 1, ..., N, ∀j = 1, ...,K − 1 : Vi(Xj) = 1/K.
So we have found an exact division and solved Exact(N,K) as required. ⊓⊔
Alon (1987) proved that for every N and K, an Exact(N,K) division might
require at least N(K − 1) + 1 components. Combining this result with the
above lemma implies the following negative result:
Theorem 2 For every N,K, let n = N(K − 1) + 1. A unanimously-propor-
tional division for n agents grouped into K families might require at least n
components.
In particular, unanimous-proportionality with connected pieces is infeasible.
4.3 Exact =⇒ UnanimousPR
Lemma 2 For every pair of integers n ≥ 2, k ≥ 1, a solution to Exact (n −
1, k) implies a solution to UnanimousPR (n, k) for any grouping of the n agents
to k families.
Proof Suppose we are given an instance of UnanimousPR(n, k), i.e, we are
given some n agents grouped into k families. Select n − 1 agents arbitrarily.
Use Exact(n − 1, k) to find a partition of C into k pieces, such that each of
the n− 1 agents values each of these pieces at exactly 1/k. Ask the n-th agent
to choose a piece with a maximal value for him/her. The average value of a
piece is 1/k, so the piece of maximal value is worth for the n-th agent at least
1/k. Give that piece to the family of the n-th agent. Give the other k − 1
pieces arbitrarily to the remaining k − 1 families. The resulting division is
unanimously-proportional. ⊓⊔
Alon (1987) proved that for every N and K, Exact(N,K) has a solution with
at most N(K − 1) + 1 components (at most N(K − 1) cuts). Combining this
result with the above lemma implies the following positive result:
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Theorem 3 Given n agents in k families with equal entitlements, a unani-
mously-proportional division with (n− 1) · (k − 1) + 1 components is feasible.
For k = 2 families, the number of components in Theorem 3 is n, which
matches the lower bound of Theorem 2. For k > 2 families, the number of
components can be made smaller, as explained below.
4.4 Less components: equal entitlements
The purpose of this subsection is to find a unanimously-proportional allocation
with fewer components than the guarantee of Theorem 3, when all families
have equal entitlements.
We start with an example. Assume there are k = 4 families. As in Theorem
3, using 3(n − 1) cuts, C can be divided into 4 subsets which are considered
equal by n−1 members. But for a unanimously-proportional division, it is not
required that all members think that all pieces are equal, it is only required
that all members believe that their family’s share is worth at least 1/4. This
can be achieved as follows:
– Divide C into two subsets which all n agents value at exactly 1/2. This is
equivalent to solving Exact(n, 2), which by Alon (1987), can be done with
at most n cuts. Call the two resulting subsets West and East.
– Assign arbitrary two families to West and the other two families to East.
Mark by nW the total number of members in the families assigned to West
and by nE the total number of members assigned to East.
– Divide the West into two pieces which all nW agents value at exactly 1/4;
this can be done with nW cuts. Give a piece to each family. Divide the
East similarly using nE cuts.
The first step requires n cuts and the second step requires nW + nE = n cuts
too. Hence the total number of cuts required is only 2n, rather than 3n− 1.
In fact, two cuts can be saved in each step by excluding two members (from
two different families) from the exact division. These members will not think
that the division is equal, but they will be allowed to choose their favorite
piece for their family. Thus only 2(n−2) cuts are required. A simple inductive
argument shows that whenever k is a power of 2, (log2 k) · (n− k/2) cuts are
required.
When k is not a power of 2, a result by Stromquist and Woodall (1985)
can be used. They prove that, for every fraction r ∈ [0, 1], it is possible to cut
a piece of C such that all n agents agree that its value is exactly r using at
most 2n− 2 cuts.12 This can be used as follows:
– Select integers l1, l2 ∈ {1, ..., k − 1} such that l1 + l2 = k.
12 They prove that, if C is a circle, the number of connected components is n− 1. Hence,
the number of cuts is 2n− 2. This is also true when C is an interval, although the number
of connected components in this case is n.
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– Apply Stromquist and Woodall (1985) with r = l1/k: using 2n − 4 cuts,
cut a piece X1 that n − 1 agents value at exactly l1/k. This means that
these n− 1 agents value the other piece, X2, at exactly l2/k.
– Let the n-th agent choose a piece for his family; assign the other families
arbitrarily such that l1 families are assigned to piece X1 and the other l2
families to piece X2.
– Recursively divide piece X1 to its l1 families and piece X2 to its l2 families.
After a finite number of recursion steps, the number of families assigned to
each piece becomes 1 and the procedure ends. The number of cuts in each level
of the recursion is at most 2n− 4. The depth of recursion can be bounded by
⌈log2 k⌉ by dividing k to halves (if it is even) or to almost-halves (if it is odd;
i.e. take l1 = (k − 1)/2 and l2 = (k + 1)/2). Hence:
Theorem 4 Given n agents in k families with equal entitlements, a unani-
mously-proportional division with ⌈log2 k⌉ · (2n−4)+1 components is feasible.
Note that Theorem 3 and Theorem 4 both give upper bounds on the number of
components required for unanimous-proportionality. The bound of Theorem
3 is stronger when k is small and the bound of Theorem 4 is stronger when k
is large.
4.5 Less components: different entitlements
The purpose of this subsection is to find a unanimously-proportional allocation
with fewer components than the guarantee of Theorem 3, when families may
have different entitlements.
When families have different entitlements, the procedure of the previous
subsection cannot be used. We cannot let the n-th agent select a piece for
his family, since the pieces are different. For example, suppose there are two
families with entitlements t1 = 1/3, t2 = 2/3. We can divide C into two pieces
X1, X2 such that n− 1 agents value X1 as 1/3 and X2 as 2/3. So all of them
agree that X1 should be given to family 1 and X2 should be given to family
2. But, the n-th agent might select the wrong piece for his family. Therefore,
the procedure should be modified as follows.
– Select an integer l ∈ {1, ..., k − 1}.
– Divide the families into two subsets: F1, . . . , Fl and Fl+1, . . . , Fk.
– Apply Stromquist and Woodall (1985) with r =
∑l
j=1 tj : using 2n−2 cuts,
cut a piece X1 which all n agents value at exactly
∑l
j=1 tj . This means
that all n agents value the other piece, X2, at exactly
∑k
j=l+1 tj .
– Recursively divide piece X1 to F1, . . . , Fl and piece X2 to Fl+1, . . . , Fk.
Here, the number of cuts in each level of the recursion is at most (2n − 2).
The depth of recursion can be bounded by ⌈log2 k⌉ by choosing l = k/2 (if k
is even) or l = (k − 1)/2 (if k is odd). Hence:
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Theorem 5 Given n agents in k families with different entitlements, a unan-
imously-proportional division with ⌈log2 k⌉ ·(2n−2)+1 components is feasible.
To conclude the analysis of unanimous-proportionality, recall that, even
for k = 2 families, unanimous-proportionality is as difficult as exact division
and might require the same number of components — n. In the worst case,
we might need to give a disjoint component to each member, which negates
the concept of division to families. Therefore we now turn to the analysis of
an alternative fairness criterion that yields more useful results.
5 Democratic fairness
Like unanimous-proportionality (Section 4), h-democratic-proportionality too
can be defined using family-valuation functions. For example, for h = 1
2
:
Wmedj (Xj) :=
mediani∈FjVi(Xj)
nj
for j ∈ {1, ..., k}.
A division is 1
2
-democratically-proportional if and only if:
∀j :Wmedj (Xj) ≥ tj
However, the Wmed functions are not additive,13 so again the classic results
referred to in Theorem 1 are inapplicable.
5.1 A division procedure
We start with a positive result for families with equal entitlements, which
shows that democratic-proportionality is substantially easier than unanimous-
proportionality.
Theorem 6 For every integer k ≥ 2, when there are k families with equal
entitlements, 1k -democratic-proportionality with connected pieces is feasible and
can be found by an efficient protocol.
Proof The Dubins-Spanier moving-knife protocol (Dubins and Spanier 1961)
can be adapted to families as follows. A knife moves continuously over the cake
from left to right. Whenever in a certain family at least 1/k of its members
believe that the cake to the left of the knife is worth at least 1/k, they shout
“stop”, the cake is cut at the knife location, and the shouting family receives
the cake to its left. The division so far is proportional for 1/k of the members
in this family.
In the remaining k − 1 families, at least (k − 1)/k of the members believe
the remaining cake is worth at least (k − 1)/k of its original value. Dividing
13 See the example in the beginning of Section 4. In that example Wmed is identical to
Wmin.
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the remaining cake recursively using the same procedure yields a division that
1/(k − 1) of (k − 1)/k of the members in each remaining family value as at
least 1/(k − 1) of (k − 1)/k of the original value; in other words, the division
is proportional for at least 1/k of the members in each family. ⊓⊔
Theorem 6 is particularly useful for k = 2 families. It implies the existence of
a connected division that is considered fair by at least a weak majority in each
family.
Unfortunately, this positive result cannot be improved — it is impossible
to guarantee the support of a weak majority when there are three or more
families, and it is impossible to guarantee the support of larger majority when
there are two families. This is proved in the following subsection.
5.2 Three or more families: an impossibility result
This subsection presents a lower bound on the number of components required
for a democratic-fair division. The lower bound holds not only for proportion-
ality but even for a much weaker fairness notion called positivity.
Given a specific division of C among families, define a zero agent as an agent
who values his family’s share as 0 and a positive agent as an agent who believes
his family received a share with a positive value. Note that proportionality
implies positivity but not vice-versa. The following lower bound holds even for
positivity, hence it also holds for proportionality.
Lemma 3 Assume there are n = mk agents, divided into k families with m
members in each family. To guarantee that at least q members in each family
are positive, the total number of components may need to be at least:
k ·
kq −m
k − 1
Proof Number the families by j = 0, ..., k− 1 and the members in each family
by i = 0, ...,m−1. Assume that C is the interval [0,mk]. In each family j, each
member i wants only the following interval: (ik+j, ik+j+1). Thus there is no
overlap between desired intervals of different members. The table below illus-
trates the construction for k = 2, m = 3. The families are {Alice,Bob,Chana}
and {David,Esther,Frank}:
Alice 1 0 0 0 0 0
Bob 0 0 1 0 0 0
Chana 0 0 0 0 1 0
David 0 1 0 0 0 0
Esther 0 0 0 1 0 0
Frank 0 0 0 0 0 1
Suppose the piece Xj (the piece given to family j) is made of l ≥ 1 com-
ponents. We can make l members of Fj positive using l intervals of positive
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length inside their desired areas. However, if q > l, we also have to make the
remaining q− l members positive. For this, we have to extend q− l intervals to
length k. Each such extension totally covers the desired area of one member
in each of the other families. Overall, each family forces q − l zero members
in each of the other families. The number of zero members in each family is
thus (k−1)(q− l). Adding the q members who must be positive in each family
gives the necessary condition: (k − 1)(q − l) + q ≤ m. This is equivalent to:
m+ l(k − 1) ≥ kq
=⇒ l ≥
kq −m
k − 1
The total number of components is k · l, which is the claimed expression. ⊓⊔
By setting q = hm in Lemma 3, we get the following lower bound on the
number of cuts in an h-democratically-proportional division:
Theorem 7 For any h ∈ [0, 1], in an h-democratically-proportional division
with n agents grouped into k families, the number of components may need to
be at least
n ·
hk − 1
k − 1
In a unanimously-proportional division h = 1, so the number of components
is at least n, which coincides with the lower bound of Theorem 2. On the
other hand, when h = 1/k the lower bound is 0, and indeed we already saw
that in this case a connected allocation is feasible (Theorem 6). However,
when h > 1/k, for sufficiently large n, the expression in Theorem 7 is larger
than k, which implies that a connected division might not exist. In particular,
we cannot guarantee a connected 1
2
-democratically-proportional division for
three or more families, and we cannot guarantee a connected h-democratically-
proportional division even for two families if h > 1/2.
5.3 Three or more families: positive results
Suppose we do want a 1
2
-democratically-proportional division for three or more
families. How many components are sufficient?
As a first positive result, we can use Theorem 5, substituting n/2 instead
of n: select half of the members in each family arbitrarily, then find a division
which is unanimously-proportional for them while ignoring all other members.
This leads to:
Theorem 8 Given n agents in k families with different entitlements, 1
2
-demo-
cratic-proportionality with 1 + ⌈log2 k⌉ · (n− 2) components is feasible.
However, for families with equal entitlements we can do much better.
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Theorem 9 Given n agents in k families with equal entitlements, 1
2
-demo-
cratic-proportionality with at most
min
(
2 + (⌈k/2⌉ − 1) · (n/2− 2) , 2 + ⌈log2⌈k/2⌉⌉ · (n− 8)
)
.
components is feasible.
Proof The proof is summarized in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 1
2
-democratically-proportional division for k ≥ 2 families.
INPUT:
- C := the unit interval [0, 1].
- n additive agents, all of whom value C as 1.
- A grouping of the agents to k families, F1, ..., Fk.
OUTPUT:
A 1
2
-democratically-proportional division of C into k pieces.
ALGORITHM:
Step 1: Halving
- Each agent i = 1, ..., n selects an xi ∈ [0, 1] such that Vi([0, xi]) =
⌈k/2⌉
k
(this means 1
2
if
k is even and k+1
2k
if k is odd). Note: Vi([xi, 1]) =
⌊k/2⌋
k
.
- For each family j = 1, ..., k, find the median of its members’ selections:Mj = mediani∈Fjxi.
- Order the families in increasing order of their medians. Find the median of the family-
medians: M∗ = M⌈k/2⌉. Cut C at x = M
∗.
Step 2: Sub-division
- Define the western families as the Fj with j = 1, ..., ⌈k/2⌉. Let nW be the total number
of members in these families. Divide the interval [0,M∗] among the western families using
UnanimousPR(nW /2, ⌈k/2⌉).
- Similarly, define the eastern families as the Fj with j = ⌈k/2⌉ + 1, ..., k. There are ⌊k/2⌋
such families. Let nE be their total number of members. Divide the interval (M
∗, 1] among
the eastern families using UnanimousPR(nE/2, ⌊k/2⌋).
The algorithm works in two steps.
Step 1: Halving. For each family, a location Mj is calculated such that,
if C is cut atMj , half the family members value the interval [0,Mj] as at least
⌈k/2⌉
k and the other half value the interval [Mj, 1] as at least
⌊k/2⌋
k . Then, C is
cut in M∗ — the median of the family medians. The ⌈k/2⌉ “western families”
— for whichMj ≤M∗ — are assigned to the western interval of C — [0,M∗].
By construction, at least half the members in each of the western families value
[0,M∗] as at least ⌈k/2⌉k . We say that these members are “happy”. Similarly,
the ⌊k/2⌋ eastern families — for which Mj ≥ M∗ — are assigned to the
eastern interval (M∗, 1]; at least half the members in each of these families are
“happy”, i.e, value the interval (M∗, 1] as at least ⌊k/2⌋k .
If there are only two families (k = 2), then we are done: there is exactly one
western family and one eastern family (⌈k/2⌉ = ⌊k/2⌋ = 1 ). For each family
j ∈ {1, 2}, at least half the members of each family value their family’s share
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as at least 1/2. Hence, the allocation of Xj to family j is
1
2
-democratically-
proportional.
If there are more than two families (k > 2), an additional step is required.
Step 2: Sub-division. Each of the two sub-intervals should be further
divided among the families assigned to it. In each family Fj , at least nj/2
members are happy. So for each Fj , select exactly nj/2 members who are
happy. Our goal now is to make sure that these agents remain happy. This can
be done using a unanimously-proportional allocation, where only nj/2 happy
members in each family (hence n/2 members overall) are counted.
The unanimously-proportional allocation guarantees that every western-
happy-member believes that his family’s share is worth at least ⌈k/2⌉k ·
1
⌈k/2⌉ =
1
k . Similarly, every eastern-happy-member believes that his family’s share is
worth at least ⌊k/2⌋k ·
1
⌊k/2⌋ =
1
k . Hence, the resulting division is
1
2
-democrati-
cally-proportional.
We now calculate the number of components in the resulting division. One
cut is required for the halving step. For the unanimously-proportional division
of the western interval, the number of required cuts is at most (⌈k/2⌉ − 1) ·
(nW /2 − 1) by Theorem 3, and at most ⌈log2⌈k/2⌉⌉ · (nW − 4) by Theorem
4. Similarly, for the eastern interval the number of required cuts is at most
the minimum of (⌊k/2⌋ − 1) · (nE/2 − 1) and ⌈log2⌊k/2⌋⌉ · (nE − 4). The
total number of cuts is thus at most 1 + (⌈k/2⌉ − 1) · (n/2 − 2) and at most
1 + ⌈log2⌈k/2⌉⌉ · (n− 8). The total number of components is larger by one.
5.4 Comparison and Open Questions
Table 1 compares the three variants of proportionality, focusing on families
with equal entitlements. Recall that n is the total number of agents in all
families.
The case of k = 2 families is well-understood. The results for all fairness
criteria are tight: by all fairness definitions, we know that a fair division exists
with the smallest possible number of connectivity components.
The case of k > 2 families opens some questions:
– Is unanimous-proportionality with n components feasible for all k? (par-
ticularly, with k = 3 families, is the number of required components n as
in the lower bound, or 2n− 1 as in the upper bound?).
– Is 1
2
-democratic-proportionality with n · k/2−1k−1 components feasible for all
k? (particularly, with k = 3 families, is the number of required components
n/4 as in the lower bound, or n/2 as in the upper bound?).
The case of different entitlements is much less understood even for individual
agents (Segal-Halevi 2019), let alone for families.
What fairness notion is the most practical? The table shows that it depends
on the total number of agents (n). When n is small (as is common when
dividing an estate among heirs), it is reasonable to try to attain a unanimously-
fair division. However, when n is large (as is common when dividing disputed
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Fairness notion k
#Connectivity Components
Compatible
with PE
Lower Upper
averagely-proportional (Sec. 3) k k k (connected) Yes
unanimously-proportional 2 n n
Yes
3 n 2n− 1
4 n 2n− 3
(Sec. 4) k n
min(1 + ⌈log2 k⌉ · (2n− 4),
(k − 1) · (n− 1) + 1)
1
2
-democratically-proportional 2 2 2 (connected)
Yes
3 n/4 n/2
4 n/3 n/2
(Sec. 5) k n ·
k/2−1
k−1
min(2 + ⌈log2⌈k/2⌉⌉ · (n− 8),
2 + (⌈k/2⌉ − 1) · (n/2− 2))
Table 1: Properties of a proportional division with different family-fairness
notions and different number of families (k). The rightmost column considers
the compatibility of the fairness notion with Pareto-efficiency.
lands among states), unanimous fairness quickly becomes impractical, as the
number of components might grow linearly with n. In this case, we must settle
for a weaker fairness criterion. When k = 2, we can find a democratically-fair
allocation that is also connected. When k > 2, democratic fairness too might
be impractical, and we may have to settle for average-fairness.
6 Pareto-efficiency
So far, we studied the compatibility of fairness criteria with a geometric re-
quirement — reducing the number of connectivity components. In this section
we replace the geometric requirement with an economic requirement — Pareto
efficiency. An allocation is called Pareto-efficient (PE) if no other allocation is
weakly better for all individual agents and strictly better for some individual
agents. Fortunately, PE is compatible even with the strongest variant of the
proportionality criterion:
Theorem 10 There always exists an allocation that is both PE and unan-
imously-proportional (hence also averagely-proportional and democratically-
proportional), even when families have different entitlements.
Proof We use a famous theorem of Dubins and Spanier (1961), which is a
special case of a measure-theoretic theorem by Dvoretzky et al (1951).
For every partition X of C into k pieces, let M(X) be its value-matrix —
an n-by-k matrix M where ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, ∀j ∈ {1, . . . , k} : Mi,j = Vi(Xj).
Let MC be the set of all matrices that correspond to such partitions:
MC := {M(X)|X is a partition of C into k pieces}
Theorem 1 of Dubins and Spanier (1961) implies that the set MC is compact.
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Define a second set of matrices representing the unanimously-proportional
condition:
MPR := {M is an n× k matrix|∀j ∈ {1, . . . , k} : ∀i ∈ Fj :Mi,j ≥ tj}
Finally, define MCPR := MC ∩MPR. This set represents all value-matrices of
allocations of C that are unanimously-proportional. By Theorem 3, MCPR is
non-empty. Since MC is compact and MPR is closed, their intersection MCPR
is compact.
Define the following function U : MCPR → R:
U(M) :=
k∏
j=1
∏
i∈Fj
Mi,j
This is a continuous function, so it has a maximum point in MCPR; let’s call it
M∗. This matrix corresponds to an allocation X∗ that maximizes, among all
unanimously-proportional allocations, the product of valuations of all agents:∏k
j=1
∏
i∈Fj
Vi(Xj). This product is strictly increasing with the value of each
agent i ∈ N , so the allocation X∗ is Pareto-efficient in the set MCPR. Since
every Pareto-improvement of an allocation in MCPR is also in MCPR, the
allocation X∗ is also Pareto-efficient in general. ⊓⊔
Remark 2 So far we considered two pairs of requirements: fairness+connectivity
and fairness+efficiency. This raises the natural question of whether connectiv-
ity+efficiency are compatible. We provide two answers.
(a) There might not exist a connected allocation that is Pareto-efficient in the
set of all allocations, even without any fairness considerations, and even with
only two individual agents (two singleton families). Moreover, the number of
components in such allocation might be unbounded.
Proof For any integer M , suppose C is the interval [0, 2M ]. Suppose agent 1
assigns a value of 1 to the intervals [0, 1], [2, 3], [4, 5], etc., and a value of 0 to
the rest of C, and agent 2 assigns a value of 1 to the intervals [1, 2], [3, 4], [5, 6],
etc., and a value of 0 to the rest of C. Then, any Pareto-efficient allocation
has 2M connected components. ⊓⊔
On the other hand:
(b) There always exists a connected allocation that is Pareto-efficient in the
set of all allocations with at most d components, where d ≥ 1 is any fixed
integer. Existence is guaranteed for any number of families with any number
of agents, and even with a unanimous-proportionality requirement.
Proof Suppose w.l.o.g. that C is the interval [0, 1]. Each division with at most
d components can be represented by a vector x1, . . . , xd where ∀i ∈ [d] : xi ∈
[0, 1] and
∑d
i=1 xi = 1 (where xi represents the length of the i-th component).
Hence the set of all such divisions can be represented by the (d−1)-dimensional
standard simplex in Rd. This set is compact and convex. Hence, similarly to
Theorem 10, this set contains an allocation that is both PE and unanimously-
proportional. ⊓⊔
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7 Envy Freeness
So far, we used proportionality as our individual fairness criterion. Another
criterion that is very common in economics is envy-freeness. We study this
criterion for families with equal entitlements.
Analogously to the definitions in subsection 2.4, we call an allocation X —
averagely-envy-free if ∀j, j′ ∈ {1, . . . , k} : W avgj (Xj) ≥W
avg
j (Xj′);
unanimously-envy-free if ∀j, j′ ∈ {1, . . . , k} : ∀i ∈ Fj : Vi(Xj) ≥ Vi(Xj′);
h-democratically-envy-free if ∀j, j′ ∈ {1, . . . , k},
for at least a fraction h of the members i ∈ Fj : Vi(Xj) ≥ Vi(Xj′ ).
With individual agents, it is well known that envy-freeness implies proportion-
ality (with equal entitlements). With two individual agents, envy-freeness and
proportionality are equivalent. The same implications are true with families.
Each variant of envy-freeness implies the corresponding variant of propor-
tionality.14 When there are k = 2 families, each variant of envy-freeness is
equivalent to the corresponding variant of proportionality.15
Most of our results for proportionality with equal entitlements are also
valid for envy-freeness. For average-envy-freeness, we can use classic results
proving the existence of envy-free allocations with connected pieces among
individual agents (Stromquist 1980; Su 1999). Applying the same reduction as
in Theorem 1 we get:
Theorem 1’ For any k families, average-envy-freeness with connected pieces
is feasible.
Since envy-freeness implies proportionality, the negative results are still
valid:
Theorem 2’ For every N,K, let n = N(K − 1) + 1. A unanimously-envy-
free division for n agents grouped into K families might require at least n
components.
Some positive results remain valid too. Lemma 2 is based on an exact divi-
sion. Therefore it holds, with the same proof, even if we replace unanimously-
proportional with unanimously-envy-free. Therefore:
Theorem 3’ Given n agents in k families, a unanimously-envy-free division
with (n− 1) · (k − 1) + 1 components is feasible.
14 Suppose an agent i ∈ Fj thinks the division is envy-free. Then Vi(Xj) is equal to
maxk
j′=1
Vi(Xj′ ). The maximum is at least as large as the average, so Vi(Xj) is at least as
large as an average value of a piece, which is Vi(C)/k.
15 Suppose an agent i ∈ Fj thinks the division is proportional. Then Vi(Xj) ≥ 1/2. By
additivity, for the other family j′ 6= j, Vi(Xj′ ) ≤ 1/2. Hence Vi(Xj) ≥ Vi(Xj′ ), so agent i
thinks the division is envy-free.
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However, the recursive-halving procedure of Theorem 4 cannot be used
here. Suppose we divide C into two subsets, West and East, which all n agents
value at exactly 1/2. Then, we assign arbitrary k/2 families to West and the
other families to East. We find an exact division of the West among the western
families and an exact division of the East among the eastern families. While
this division is proportional, it is not necessarily envy-free, since the agents
in the west might envy families in the east and vice versa. Therefore, while
the number of components required for unanimously-proportional division is
in O(n log k), the best we can currently say about the number of components
required for unanimously-envy-free is that it is in O(nk).
The positive result of Theorem 6 holds for envy-freeness too:
Theorem 6’ For every integer k ≥ 2, there exists a connected division among
k families, that is envy-free for at least 1/k of the members in each family.
Proof Su (1999) presents a procedure (attributed to Simmons) for finding a
connected envy-free division among k individual agents. It is based on present-
ing various connected partitions to the agents, and asking each agent which
of the k pieces is the best. He proves that there exists a partition in which
each agent gives a different answer; that partition corresponds to an envy-free
allocation. He also shows a procedure for finding a sequence of partitions that
converges (after possibly infinitely many steps) to that envy-free allocation.
The Simmons-Su procedure can be adapted to families in the following
way. Whenever a family is asked “which of the k pieces is better?”, it answers
by doing a plurality voting among its members. Then, in the final division,
each family receives a piece that is considered the best by a plurality of its
members, which is at least a fraction 1/k of its members. Therefore, at least
1/k of each family’s members feel that the final allocation is envy-free. ⊓⊔
Similarly, the negative result for h-democratic-proportionality in Theorem
7 is valid for h-democratic-envy-freeness too.
Theorem 9 about 1
2
-democratic-proportionality does not hold as-is for 1
2
-
democratic-envy-freeness, but it can be adapted by adapting Algorithm 1. Step
1 — the halving step — remains the same. Step 2 — the subdivision step —
should be modified to use an exact division, as follows:
- Using Exact(n/2, ⌈k/2⌉) , find an exact division of the interval [0,M∗]
into ⌈k/2⌉ pieces, such that all n/2 happy agents find the pieces equal.
Assign these pieces to the western families — the Fj with j = 1, ..., ⌈k/2⌉.
- Using Exact(n/2, ⌊k/2⌋) , find an exact division of the interval (M∗, 1]
into ⌊k/2⌋ pieces, such that all n/2 happy agents find the pieces equal.
Assign the pieces to the eastern families — Fj with j = ⌈k/2⌉+1, ..., k.
The halving step requires a single cut. The two exact divisions require
(n/2)·(k−2) cuts. Therefore the total number of components is n(k−2)/2+2:
Theorem 9’ Given n agents in k families with equal entitlements, 1
2
-demo-
cratic-envy-freeness with at most n(k − 2)/2 + 2 components is feasible.
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Fairness notion k
#Connectivity Components
Lower bound Upper bound
Compatible
with PE
averagely-envy-free Any k k (connected) Yes
2 n n Yes
unanimously-envy-
free
3 n 2n− 1 No
(Sec. 4) 4 n 3n− 2 No
Any n (k − 1) · (n− 1) + 1 No
2 2 2 (connected) Yes
1
2
-democratically-
envy-free
3 n/4 n/2 + 2 ?
(Sec. 5) 4 n/3 n+ 1 ?
Any n ·
k/2−1
k−1
n · (k − 2)/2 + 2 No (k ≥ 5)
Table 2: Properties of envy-free division with different family-fairness no-
tions and different number of families (k). The rightmost column considers
the compatibility of the fairness notion with Pareto-efficiency.
Table 2 summarizes our results for envy-free division and shows some re-
maining gaps.
We now consider the combination of envy-freeness with Pareto-efficiency.
Some of our positive results from Section 6 are still valid:
Theorem 10’ (a) With k = 2 families, there always exists an allocation that
is both PE and unanimously-envy-free (hence also h-democratically-envy-free
for any h).
(b) With any number of families, there always exists an allocation that is
PE and averagely-envy-free.
Proof (a) With k = 2 families, envy-freeness and proportionality are equiva-
lent, so this follows directly from Theorem 10.
(b) We use the same reduction as in Theorem 1 and the same compactness
argument as in Theorem 10. For each family Fj , define a representative agent
Aj whose valuation isW
avg
j . There exists an allocation X
∗ that maximizes the
product of valuations of the representatives:
∏k
j=1W
avg
j (Xj).
Segal-Halevi and Sziklai (2018a, Section 5) prove, in the setting of cake-
cutting among individuals, that every allocation maximizing the product of
values is envy-free. Therefore, in the allocation X∗, there is no envy among
the representatives. By definition of averagely-envy-free, X∗ is an averagely-
envy-free allocation among the families.
The product
∏k
j=1W
avg
j (Xj) is strictly increasing with the value of each
individual agent i ∈ N . Therefore, the allocation X∗ maximizing this product
is Pareto-efficient. ⊓⊔
Next, consider Remark 2 regarding connectivity and efficiency. Part (a)
holds regardless of fairness considerations. Part (b) implies that there always
exists a unanimously-proportional allocation that is PE in the set of connected
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allocations; this positive result is not true when we replace proportionality with
envy-freeness, even with singleton families. This is proved by Example 5.1 in
Segal-Halevi and Sziklai (2018b).
Even without connectivity constraints, Pareto-efficiency is incompatible
with unanimous-envy-freeness and democratic-envy-freeness.
The incompatibility between PE and unanimous-envy-freeness appears even
when we take a minimal step forward from the case of two families: there are
three families, only one of which is a couple and the other two are singles.
Theorem 11 With three or more families, there might be no allocation that
is both PE and unanimously-envy-free.
Proof The proof is based on an example used by Bade and Segal-Halevi (2018)
in the context of fair division of homogeneous goods. C is an interval composed
of two sub-intervals Y and Z of length 1. C has to be divided among three
families — a couple and two singles — with the following valuations:
Y Z
Alice 1 1
George 7 1
Bob 2 1
Esther 5 1
Suppose that we have a unanimously-envy-free allocation of C among the three
families. Denote by YAG, ZAG the lengths of Y, Z given to Alice+George, and
similarly YB, ZB, YE , ZE are the lengths given to Bob and Esther. Then:
7YAG + ZAG ≥ 7YB + ZB (George does not envy Bob)
2YB + ZB ≥ 2YAG + ZAG (Bob does not envy George)
(7− 2)YAG ≥ (7− 2)YB (from the above inequalities)
(∗) YAG ≥ YB
1YAG + ZAG ≥ 1YB + ZB (Alice does not envy Bob)
2YB + ZB ≥ 2YAG + ZAG (Bob does not envy Alice)
(1− 2)YAG ≥ (1− 2)YB (from the above inequalities)
(∗∗) YAG ≤ YB
(∗ ∗ ∗) YAG = YB (from * and **)
=⇒ ZAG = ZB (Bob and Alice+George do not envy)
We proved that, in any unanimously-envy-free allocation, the share given to
Alice+George is identical to the share given to Bob (i.e, the same lengths of
both subintervals). The proof does not depend on the exact valuation functions
— it only depends on the fact that 1 < 2 < 7, i.e, Bob’s valuation of Y is
strictly between Alice’s and George’s valuations. Hence, exactly the same proof
works for Esther, i.e: YAG = YE and ZAG = ZE . Therefore, the shares given
to all three families are identical.
We now prove that this allocation cannot be PE. We consider three cases.
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– Case 1: YB = 0. Then also YE = YAG = 0 so Y remains unallocated and
the allocation is not PE.
– Case 2: ZE = 0. Then also ZB = ZAG = 0 so Z remains unallocated and
the allocation is not PE.
– Case 3: YB and ZE are positive. Let ǫ = min(YB , ZE/3). Suppose that Bob
gives ǫ of his Y to Esther, and gets in exchange 3ǫ of her Z. Then, Bob’s
value increases by 3ǫ − 2ǫ; Esther’s value increases by 5ǫ − 3ǫ; and the
values of Alice and George are unchanged. This means that the original
allocation was not Pareto-efficient. ⊓⊔
Weakening unanimously-envy-free to democratically-envy-free does not help
when there are 5 or more families.
Theorem 12 With five or more families, there might be no allocation that is
both PE and democratically-envy-free.
Proof The proof is based on an extension of the example of Theorem 11, where
there are five families — one triplet and four singles — with the valuations:
Y Z
Alice 1/4 1
Dina 1 1
George 4 1
Bob 1/2 1
Chana 1/3 1
Esther 2 1
Frank 3 1
Suppose that we have a democratically-envy-free allocation of C among the
families. By definition of democratically-envy-free, all singles must not feel any
envy. Moreover, in the first family, at least two members must not feel any
envy. There are three options for the identity of these non-envious members.
Option A: Alice and Dina feel no envy. We consider Bob and Chana. The
value of Y for each of them is strictly between the value of Y for Alice and the
value of Y for Dina. Therefore, similar arguments as in the proof of Theorem
11 imply that the three allocations of Chana, Bob, and Alice+Dina+George
are identical. Now there are three cases:
– Case A1: YC = 0. Then also YB = YADG = 0. Each of Chana, Bob, and
Alice+Dina+George receive at most 1/3 of Z, so Dina’s value is at most
1/3. Since Dina does not envy Esther and Frank, each of them must receive
at most 1/3 of Y . This means that at least 1/3 of Y remains unallocated,
so the allocation is not PE.
– Case A2: ZB = 0. Then also ZC = ZADG = 0. Again Dina’s value is at
most 1/3, so Esther and Frank must receive at most 1/3 of Z, so at least
1/3 of Z remains unallocated, so the allocation is not PE.
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– Case A3: YC and ZB are positive. Then, Bob can give ǫ/2.5 of his Z to
Chana in exchange for ǫ of her Y (for some small ǫ > 0) and attain a
Pareto improvement, so the original allocation is not PE.
Option B: George and Dina feel no envy. We consider Esther and Frank.
The value of Y for each of them is strictly between the value of Y for George
and the value of Y for Dina. Therefore the three allocations of Esther, Frank,
and Alice+Dina+George are identical. The rest of the proof is analogous to
Option A.
Option C: Alice and George feel no envy. The value of Y for all the
singles is strictly between the value of Y for Alice and the value of Y for
George. Therefore, the allocations of all five families must be identical. The
rest of the proof is analogous to Theorem 11. ⊓⊔
An interesting question that is left open by Theorems 10’ and 12 is what
happens when there are 3 or 4 families — does there always exist an allocation
that is both PE and democratically-envy-free?
8 Related Work
There are numerous papers about fair division in general and fair cake-cutting
in particular. We mentioned some of them in the introduction. Here we survey
some work that is more closely related to family-based fairness.
8.1 Dividing other kinds of resources among families
In a contemporaneous and independent line of work, several authors have stud-
ied the problem of fairly dividing discrete items among families (Manurangsi and Suksompong
2017; Suksompong 2018a,b; Kyropoulou et al 2019)
They focused on unanimous fairness. They proved that, in many cases,
unanimously-fair allocations do not exist. These results complement our im-
possibility results for unanimous fairness in dividing a continuous resource.
After the publication of their work and our working paper, we joined forces to
study democratic-fair allocation of discrete goods among families (Segal-Halevi and Suksompong
2018).
Recently, Ghodsi et al (2018) studied fair division of rooms and rent among
families, using three notions of fairness which they term strong, aggregate and
weak. Their strong fairness is our unanimous fairness; their aggregate fairness
is our average fairness; their weak fairness means that at least one agent does
not envy.
In another recent work, Bade and Segal-Halevi (2018) studied fair and ef-
ficient allocation of homogeneous divisible resources among families.
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8.2 Group-envy-freeness and on-the-fly coalitions
Berliant et al (1992); Hu¨sseinov (2011); Todo et al (2011) study the concept of
group-envy-freeness. They assume the standard model of fair division among
individuals (and not among families). They define a group-envy-free division as
a division in which no coalition of individuals can take the pieces allocated to
another coalition with the same number of individuals and re-divide the pieces
among its members such that all members are weakly better-off. Coalitions in
cake-cutting are also studied by Dall’Aglio et al (2009); Dall’Aglio and Di Luca
(2014).
In our setting, the families are pre-determined and the agents do not form
coalitions on-the-fly. In an alternative model, in which agents are allowed to
form coalitions based on their preferences, the family-fair-division problem
becomes easier. For instance, it is easy to achieve a unanimously-proportional
division with connected pieces between two coalitions: ask each agent to mark
its median line, find the median of all medians, then divide the agents to two
coalitions according to whether their median line is to the left or to the right
of the median-of-medians.
8.3 Fair division with public goods
In our setting, the piece given to each family is considered a ”public good”
in this specific family. The existence of fair allocations of homogeneous goods
when some of the goods are public has been studied e.g. by Diamantaras
(1992); Diamantaras and Wilkie (1994, 1996); Guth and Kliemt (2002). In
these studies, each good is either private (consumed by a single agent) or
public (consumed by all agents). In the present paper, each piece is consumed
by all agents in a single family — a situation not captured by existing public-
good models.
8.4 Matching markets
Besides fair division, family preferences are important in matching markets,
too. For example, when matching doctors to hospitals, usually a husband and a
wife who are both doctors want to be matched to the same hospital. This issue
poses a substantial challenge to stable-matching mechanisms (Klaus and Klijn
2005, 2007; Kojima et al 2013; Ashlagi et al 2014).
The idea of satisfying a certain fairness notion for only a certain fraction
of the population, rather than unanimously, has also been studied in the con-
text of matching markets. For example, Ortega (2018) proves that, when two
matching markets are merged and a stable matching mechanism is run, it is
impossible to attain monotonic improvement for everyone, but it is possible
to attain monotonic improvement for at least half the population.
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8.5 Non-additive utilities
As explained in Sections 4 and 5, the difficulty with unanimous-proportion-
ality and democratic-proportionality is that the associated family-valuation
functions are not additive. It is therefore interesting to compare our work to
other works on cake-cutting with non-additive valuations.
Berliant et al (1992); Maccheroni and Marinacci (2003); Dall’Aglio and Maccheroni
(2005) focus on sub-additive, or concave, valuations, in which the sum of the
values of the parts is more than the value of the whole. These works are not
applicable to our setting, because the family-valuations are not necessarily
sub-additive — the sum of values of the parts might be smaller than the value
of the whole (see the example in the beginning of Section 4).
Sagara and Vlach (2005); Dall’Aglio and Maccheroni (2009); Hu¨sseinov and Sagara
(2013) consider general non-additive value functions. They provide pure exis-
tence proofs and do not say much about the nature of the resulting divisions
(e.g, the number of connectivity components), which we believe is important
in practical division applications.
Su (1999) presents a protocol for envy-free division with connected pieces
which does not assume additivity of valuations. However, when the valuations
are non-additive, there are no guarantees about the value per agent. In par-
ticular, with non-additive valuations, the resulting division is not necessarily
proportional.
Mirchandani (2013) suggests a division protocol for non-additive valuations
using non-linear programming. However, the protocol is practical only when
the resource to divide is a collection of a small number of homogeneous com-
ponents, where the only thing that matters is what fraction of each component
is allocated to each agent. In contrast, in our model the resource is a single
heterogeneous good.
Finally, Berliant and Dunz (2004); Caragiannis et al (2011); Segal-Halevi et al
(2015) study specific non-additive value functions which are motivated by geo-
metric considerations (location, size and shape). The present paper contributes
to this line of work by studying specific non-additive value functions which
are motivated by a different consideration: handling the different preferences
of family members. A possible future research topic is to find fair division
rules that handle these considerations simultaneously, as both of them are
important for fair division of land.
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